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INTRODUCTION
P
erhaps the most fundamental axiom of
modern economic science is that there
is no such thing as a free lunch. It is
this axiom that gives us the concept of oppor-
tunity cost, an idea that has led to enormous
gains in the clarity of our understanding of
individual and societal choice. But while con-
tinuing to endorse this fundamental axiom,
many economists have also been extremely
attracted by the appeal of increased economic
efficiency. Efficiency gains are often treated,
if not exactly as a free lunch, certainly about
as close to a free lunch as one can get in this
sublunar realm. As a result, economists often
react with a certain incredulity when some-
one questions the need for such gains. It is
tempting to suppose that the critic simply
misunderstands the relevant concepts, or else
fails to grasp the full set of constraints under
which economic activity occurs.
Productivity growth is widely regarded
as a subset of the efficiency gains that can be
realized in our economy. Thus to question the
need for increased productivity seems initially
to fall under the same category of suspicion.
Yet this is precisely what I intend to do. As a
way of conferring some initial legitimacy
upon this enterprise, I would like to start out
simply by appealing to the “no free lunch”
principle. To adopt productivity growth as a
social priority is to set aside other objectives
that we might like to pursue. Therefore, one
cannot maintain rational adherence to a pro-
gram of increased productivity without a clear
sense of what the beneﬁts of such a program
are likely to be, compared to the other things
that we might choose to do. The bulk of this
paper consists of an attempt to evaluate the
size and scope of these beneﬁts. More contro-
versially, I will try to show that these bene-
ﬁts are often exaggerated.
The conclusion that I draw on the basis
of this survey will strike many as complacent.
But it is a principled complacency. I argue
that we have good reason, as a society, to strive
for productivity gains, but that there is noth-
ing urgent about this objective. Furthermore,
we should not strive to maximize productivity
gains, nor should we be overly concerned
about our relative productivity levels. The
note of urgency that is struck in much of the
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contribution that economic growth will
make to the welfare of individual Canadians.
The underlying problem, I will argue, is that
even though we live in an extremely rich
society, we continue to think and act as
though we lived in a poor one. Correcting
this bias allows us to put the issue of pro-
ductivity growth into perspective.
WHY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH?
When evaluating the merits of increased
productivity, it is helpful to begin by exam-
ining the beneﬁts that have traditionally been
thought to ﬂow from productivity growth —
or, more accurately, the beneﬁts that were
promised in much of the popular and aca-
demic writing on the subject. Needless to say,
productivity is not an intrinsic value. It is a
technical efficiency concept, stating in effect
the ratio of useful economic output to some
speciﬁed bundle of inputs.
1 Thus increased
productivity, roughly put, allows us to do
more with less, but it does not specify what
it is that we intend to do. In order to evaluate
the merits of increased productivity, there-
fore, we need to look at what these increases
were supposed to allow us to do. Here are
some of the beneﬁts that have often been
thought to ﬂow from productivity growth:
Increased Leisure. This is the big payoff
that has always been the expected outcome
of increased labour productivity. It is cer-
tainly the payoff that has most widely cap-
tured the popular imagination. Between the
late 19th century and the second half of the
20th, there was a steady decline in the length
of the average workweek. It was assumed that
productivity growth would allow this trend
to continue. After all, if it takes us less time
to produce all of the things that we need to
lead happy and fulﬁlling lives, then it seems
natural that we should have to work less.
And even if the aggregate number of hours
worked remains constant or increases, pro-
ductivity growth should give individuals
much greater freedom when it comes to
choosing the number of hours that they
themselves want to work.
Increased Consumer Satisfaction. Increased
productivity essentially gives us a “bonus”
that we can choose to spend in one of two
ways, by cutting back on work hours or by
producing more. It is natural that individuals
will differ in their choice between these two
options, and that a signiﬁcant number will
opt to increase their consumption of market
goods rather than their leisure. As a result,
productivity growth should generate eco-
nomic growth, permitting increased con-
sumption, which in turn should increase
consumer satisfaction.
Elimination of Poverty. These ﬁrst two
points are not really that dissimilar — in both
cases productivity growth is touted as a way
of increasing welfare. Increases in productive
efficiency are regarded here as a way to gener-
ate gains in Pareto-efficiency. (The fact that
increased leisure needs to be treated in its own
category is merely an artifact of the way that
the system of national accounts is compiled.)
However, the Pareto-efficiency standard is
neutral with respect to questions of distribu-
tion. Thus it is quite possible for the beneﬁts
of productivity gains to be entirely “captured”
by one stratum of society — and this would
still count as an improvement according to the
ﬁrst two criteria. Nevertheless, it was often
suggested that the beneﬁts of productivity
growth would be enjoyed by all classes of
228
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Thus absolute poverty would be eliminated.
Decreased Social Inequality. While many
proponents of productivity growth suggested
that the problem of poverty could be elimi-
nated through economic growth alone, with-
out the need for redistribution, there was also,
for a long time, the expectation that growth
would make it easier to implement redistrib-
utive social policies. Society could therefore
diminish not only absolute poverty but also
relative poverty. This idea found expression in
the ideal, widely shared in the 1950s, of a soci-
ety in which everyone was essentially middle
class. The thought, simply put, was that afflu-
ence would make people less possessive, that
an excess of riches would make them less hos-
tile to the prospect of sharing with others. This
thought was of course not universally shared,
nor was the underlying egalitarian project
endorsed in all corners, but it did nevertheless
serve as an important source of hope for many.
So, did productivity growth deliver on
these promises? I think we must concede
that, in the past 25 years, results have fallen
signiﬁcantly short of expectations. In some
cases, productivity gains have provided nec-
essary but not sufficient conditions for the
realization of these objectives. In other cases,
increased productivity seems to have con-
tributed nothing at all.
As far as increased leisure is concerned,
the last three decades of the 20th century
were singularly unimpressive. Most signiﬁ-
cantly, the trend towards a reduced work-
week, which dominated the ﬁrst half of the
century, seems to have come to a halt in
North America.
2 Between 1981 and 1992, for
instance, average working hours among
employed Canadians increased by over 15 per-
cent (Zuzanek and Smale 1997, 78).
Furthermore, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of two-career house-
holds, corresponding to the widely shared
perception that it is no longer possible to
maintain a middle-class family lifestyle on the
basis of only one salary. Thus achieving
“work-family balance” has become increas-
ingly difficult for many Canadians.
I think it is easy to lose track of how
unexpected and puzzling this development
(or rather this lack of development) is. If one
had done a survey of Canadian economists in
1975, asking them to predict the length of
the standard workweek in the year 2000, I
wonder how many would have guessed that
it would be unchanged? In fact, the goal of
increasing leisure has come to seem so remote
that it has almost completely fallen off the
public agenda. The case for increased produc-
tivity is almost always made as a way of increas-
ing per capita GDP. (Thus in the discussion
that follows I will simplify the presentation
somewhat by assuming that productivity is val-
ued for the sake of increasing output, not
decreasing input.)
As for increased satisfaction, there is also
something of a puzzle here. While the standard
of living has risen quite steadily, there is no
evidence that this has led to any lasting gains
in welfare. The issue here is not simply one of
diminishing marginal returns to increases in
consumption of market goods. Beyond a cer-
tain basic consumption level, there is simply
no correlation between higher consumption
and increased happiness (Frey and Stutzer
2001, 76-91; see also Easterlin 1974). Of
course, there are important measurement prob-
lems when it comes to talking about people’s
level of happiness. Nevertheless, given the
instruments we have, study after study has
shown that in poor countries increased wealth
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happiness, but that once the threshold of about
US$10,000 GDP per capita is passed, happi-
ness levels have no further tendency to rise in
response to economic growth. As a case in
point, average happiness in the United States
fell by about 9 percent between 1946 and
1991, according to one measure (Frey and
Stutzer 2001, 76).
With respect to poverty, it was widely
assumed that capitalism would generate
such a preposterous excess of wealth that
nothing even vaguely resembling poverty
could persist. Joseph Schumpeter (1950, 66),
for example, in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy, predicted that
If capitalism repeated its past performance for
another half century starting with 1928,
this would do away with anything that
according to present standards could be called
poverty, even in the lowest strata of the popu-
lation, pathological cases alone excepted.
Of course, capitalism did much more than
repeat its past performance between 1928 and
1978, but this did not lead to the eradication
of poverty.
Where there have been signiﬁcant
improvements in the welfare of the poor, it has
largely been due to redistributive government
programs, such as socialized medicine, or old
age pensions. Thus signiﬁcant reductions in the
level of poverty were recorded in Canada after
the Second World War, with the growth of the
welfare state, but there has been no decrease in
the rate of “basic needs” poverty since the late
1970s (see Sarlo 2001).
Finally, there has been a disturbing trend
towards increased social inequality in the last
30 years in North America. This has been mit-
igated to some extent in Canada through pro-
gressive taxation and redistributive policies of
the welfare state (see Wolfson and Murphy
2000). Nevertheless, popular wisdom suggests
that resistance to such redistribution has been
increasing. Certainly, tax resistance among the
middle class has been growing, although it is
not clear how much of this reﬂects a free-rider
incentive and how much reﬂects genuine oppo-
sition to redistribution. In any case, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that the North American
population has become more receptive to egal-
itarianism in the past 30 years.
This having been said, I think it would
be entirely unreasonable to question the mas-
sive contribution that productivity gains in
general have made to our overall quality of
life. It is of course because of these gains that
we now live in a rich society and not a poor
one. But the fact that past productivity gains
have given us so many of the things that we
now enjoy does not guarantee that future
gains will continue to deliver the same
results. The track record on this score has
become quite mixed in the last 25 years.
SOLVING THE MYSTERY
If there is one trend that I think should
be most disturbing to proponents of produc-
tivity growth, it is the failure of economic
growth to increase happiness. After all, what
is the point of producing more if the result
is no net gain in consumer satisfaction?
Productivity growth was supposed to create
something of a “bonus,” to create some slack
in the average consumer’s budget. It was
assumed that society would react to growth
in much the same way that individuals react
to getting a raise or a tax refund. It should
have allowed us to relax a bit, not work as
hard, indulge some tastes that previously
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a bit more with those less fortunate than our-
selves. Unfortunately, even the prosperous
middle classes continue to feel “squeezed”
economically. Despite decades of growth,
people continue to act and feel as through
they were under a severe budget constraint.
What could possibly explain this? The
most obvious explanation is simply that con-
sumption standards have increased at approx-
imately the same pace as economic growth.
This will be pretty obvious to anyone who has
seen a recently constructed suburban home.
Not only has the average size of new single-
family dwellings increased, from 1,100 square
feet in the 1950s to over 2,000 square feet
today, but even base models now include
amenities that were once available only to the
very rich (Frank 1999, 21). Most new homes,
for example, contain at least one bathroom per
bedroom. Yet are people any happier once they
move into these houses? All available evidence
suggests that the answer is no. Yet they still
buy them. And not only do they buy them,
they pay more for them. Hence the puzzle —
why no increase in satisfaction?
The issue acquires greater urgency
when we realize that, if expanding production
is not the route to increased happiness, per-
haps there is something else we might be
doing with our time and energy that would
be more effective. Thus it will pay to explore
some of the hypotheses that have been
advanced to explain the “gap” between wealth
and happiness, in order to map out these pos-
sibilities more perspicuously.
One way of approaching the issue is to
note that the no-happiness outcome would
not occur if markets and welfare were tied
together in the way that the ﬁrst fundamen-
tal theorem of welfare economics presuppos-
es. Thus a promising strategy is to look at the
assumptions needed for this result to hold, and
consider which ones may not be satisﬁed. The
ﬁrst theorem, for instance, assumes that con-
sumers are never satiated, that their preferences
are ﬁxed and that their consumption does not
generate any externalities. These assumptions
are tolerably close to reality in cases where peo-
ple are extremely poor, but it is not at all
obvious that they remain plausible in more
affluent societies. It is possible that one or
more of these effects has become large
enough that it has begun to negate the wel-
fare gains achieved through increased satis-
faction of consumer demand.
There is, however, considerable dis-
agreement over the source of these effects.
We can discern roughly three currents of
thought in the literature.
Proliferation of Desire
The most common diagnosis of the prob-
lem can be referred to, following John Kenneth
Galbraith (1976), as the “squirrel-wheel
hypothesis.” According to this view, increased
consumption does not generate lasting incre-
ments in welfare because the process of pro-
duction itself generates new wants and needs.
3
The standard pro-growth picture imagines that
humans have a relatively ﬁxed set of desires, and
that, as time passes, we acquire the capacity to
satisfy more and more of them. If welfare is a
function of how many of our desires get satis-
ﬁed, or to what extent, then increased produc-
tion should lead to greater welfare. However, if
the process through which we satisfy our desires
generates new ones, then consumption will not
necessarily increase welfare. This is the hypoth-
esis that Galbraith entertained.
Such a process could occur through an
entirely internal psychological mechanism.
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might have a self-defeating character is one
of the oldest, and more recurrent, ideas in the
history of philosophical reﬂection on the
nature of the good life. According to most
Greek philosophers of the classical period, for
instance, the problem with hedonism was
that it could not generate satisfaction or hap-
piness. As soon as you satisfy one desire,
another one springs up to take its place.
Furthermore, this second desire is likely to
be more extravagant and difficult to satisfy.
As a result, we are much better off in the
long run if we try to moderate our desires,
and control their proliferation. This is what
makes self-mastery such an important moral
idea in classical Greek philosophy.
Put in more contemporary terms, one can
summarize this theory as the view that con-
sumption in general has the structure of an
addiction. For example, Tibor Scitovsky (1992)
argues that the feeling of subjective well-being
is generated not by the state of having one’s
desires satisﬁed, but rather by the stimulus asso-
ciated with the process of satisfying them. As a
result, acquiring some new good generates an
initial burst of pleasure, but this feeling tapers
off quite quickly as the individual adapts. In the
same way that individuals can “feel” only accel-
eration, not velocity, we experience pleasure
only from changes in our consumption, and not
from its absolute level. Thus just as individuals
get “velocetized” when travelling at high
speeds, they get “consumerized” when living
with high levels of absolute consumption.
Other theorists have advanced somewhat
“thinner” psychological theories to explain the
phenomenon. Richard Easterlin (1996), for
instance, argues that the level of satisfaction an
individual derives from his consumption will
be relative to his expectations. As a result, when
the general consumption level rises, expecta-
tions rise along with it, leaving satisfaction con-
stant. More generally, there is an inﬂuential
current of popular social criticism that blames
advertising for the “manufacture of desire.”
According to this view, advertising creates
demand for products by stimulating dissatis-
faction, continuously reminding us of what we
don’t have and the pleasures that we are miss-
ing out on.
Competitive Consumption
While there is clearly some truth in the
squirrel-wheel hypothesis, there are some
aspects of the no-satisfaction puzzle that it
seems unable to explain. In particular, there is
an unmistakable correlation between income
level and experienced happiness within every
society (Frey and Stutzer 2001, 83). In other
words, while the absolute income level seems
not to be that important beyond a certain
point, the relative income level remains quite
central (Frank 1999, 111-115; also Scitovsky
1992, 134-136). If consumption just gener-
ates a further proliferation of desire, it is
unclear why such a pattern should obtain.
The most obvious explanation for the
relationship between happiness and income
level can be referred to as the “neo-Veblenian”
analysis. In The Theory of the Leisure Class,
Thorstein Veblen (1979) observes that goods
have both material and “honoriﬁc” properties.
Consumption of a good not only satisﬁes a
given individual need, but also communicates
important information to others about the
consumer’s status, class, upbringing, taste and
aspirations. These messages help to position
the consumer within a variety of different social
hierarchies. The problem with this second
dimension of consumption is that the relevant
set of hierarchies has a zero-sum structure. The
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for one person to acquire more, another person
must have less. Similarly, beauty is entirely rel-
ative — when one very beautiful person shows
up, everyone else starts to look somewhat less
beautiful.
In Veblen’s terms, the value of such
goods depends upon some aspect of “invidious
comparison.” As a result, consumption of these
goods creates what we would now refer to as a
prisoner’s dilemma, or a collective action prob-
lem, because everyone’s consumption generates
negative externalities for others. If one person
works a bit harder in order to purchase an exot-
ic imported automobile, everyone else’s car
begins to look somewhat inferior. This may
prompt the neighbours to follow suit. Once
they are all driving exotic automobiles, this
cancels out whatever gain in status may have
accrued to the ﬁrst person who got one. Thus
escalating material consumption can easily
coincide with an absence of gains in satisfac-
tion, simply because the goods are being pur-
chased primarily for their social properties
rather than their intrinsic ones. Under such
circumstances, the absolute consumption level
will be poorly correlated with welfare, where-
as relative consumption will be more deter-
minative, simply because it is relative
consumption that determines the position that
one is able to achieve in the various social hier-
archies.
Robert Frank, perhaps the most inﬂu-
ential contemporary neo-Veblenian, has
emphasized that individuals need not be
superﬁcial or status-obsessed in order to fall
into this sort of competitive consumption.
The central issue is whether the goods con-
sumed derive some signiﬁcant fraction of
their value from a comparison with others.
For example, the adjective “nice” is often
used to ﬂag the comparative value of goods.
One can go out for dinner to a restaurant, or
one can go to a “nice” restaurant; one can buy
a simple corkscrew for a friend, or one can
buy a “nice” corkscrew, and so on. What
makes the good in question “nice” is its supe-
riority to the plain one. Thus wanting to live
in a house with nice things implicitly com-
mits one to the logic of competitive con-
sumption, because as others acquire nice
things as well, what was once nice becomes
increasingly plain.
Frank points out that the concept of a
“spacious” home has the same structure. What
counts as spacious is very much dependent
upon the size of everyone else’s home.
Extremely rich people in New York city live
quite happily in apartments that would seem
impossibly cramped by the standards of Palo
Alto. These apartments actually feel quite spa-
cious when one is in New York, simply because
they are large relative to what other people
have. But because of this comparison, the only
way to satisfy such a preference is to buy a
home that is of above-average size. When
everyone does this, the average size creeps
upwards. Thus more resources are invested in
home construction and maintenance, while
the increase in satisfaction associated with the
feeling of spaciousness is quickly eroded.
People are often forced to engage in
this sort of competition even if they have no
desire to surpass others, but simply a desire
to keep up. This can be thought of as “defen-
sive consumption.” Such consumption gen-
erates no welfare gain; it just forestalls a loss
induced by negative externalities from other
consumers. For example, a candidate for a job
may increase his or her chances of success by
purchasing a very expensive suit. As a result,
the other job candidates may be forced to do
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their chances beyond the prior probability —
it simply prevents them from falling behind.
This process goes on in many different areas
(the amount that one must spend in order to
purchase a respectable wedding present, to
take a date to a nice restaurant, etc.), creat-
ing a general tendency for standards of con-
sumption to “ratchet up” over time.
Positional Goods
The neo-Veblenian critique focuses on
the social character of certain goods as a source
of unproductive competition. There is a close-
ly related strand of discussion in the literature,
stemming from the work of Fred Hirsch, that
focuses simply on the fact that the supply of
some goods is necessarily ﬁxed, and so not sub-
ject to expansion with the rest of the econo-
my. Insofar as these goods are coveted, this
means that one’s access to them will be deter-
mined not by one’s overall level of wealth, but
rather by one’s relative ability to pay. Hirsch
refers to these as positional goods.
There is signiﬁcant overlap between
this analysis and the neo-Veblenian one. In
both cases the supply of a given good is gov-
erned by a zero-sum logic, and so consumers
can get caught up in unproductive competi-
tion when they try to acquire them. In the
case of positional goods, however, there is not
necessarily an element of comparison involved
in their valuation. For example, the amount
of waterfront property in a given region is
ﬁxed. As a result, one’s access to this good is
always going to be determined by one’s rela-
tive level of wealth. Economic growth is, in
general, not going to increase any particular
individual’s chances of acquiring it.
The second major component of Hirsch’s
analysis is the view that, in our society, the pri-
mary differences between the consumption
habits of the rich and the poor all involve access
to positional goods. In a poor country, absolute
deprivation often means that the rich have
material goods that the poor do not: food, shel-
ter, clothing, clean water and so on. This
makes it possible to narrow the gap between
rich and poor through increased production.
After a while, however, the poor wind up with
approximately the same material goods as the
rich. At this point, the only outstanding dif-
ferences are ones that involve access to posi-
tional goods — that is, goods that the rich
have access to precisely by virtue of their rela-
tive, rather than absolute, level of wealth.
According to Hirsch, this is why eco-
nomic growth in our society, rather than
reducing the frustration of the broad middle
classes, has tended to exacerbate it. “What the
wealthy have today can no longer be delivered
to the rest of us tomorrow, yet as we individ-
ually grow richer, this is what we expect”
(Hirsch 1976, 67). It is easy to imagine, for
instance, the nice house that one could buy
with a 10 percent increase in salary. But if this
10 percent increase is achieved through eco-
nomic growth, one will be in no better posi-
tion to purchase that house than before,
simply because all the people that one is com-
peting against to get the house will have more
to spend as well. The fallacy here is one of
composition. “To see total economic advance
as individual advance writ large is to set up
expectations that cannot be fulﬁlled, ever”
(Hirsch 1976, 9).
This affects welfare in several ways. Hirsch
argues that the national accounts inevitably gen-
erate false expectations because they treat all
household purchases as ﬁnal consumption. Many
of the purchases made within the household,
though, have a purely instrumental character.
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itself; they simply use it to acquire access to some
other good that they want. Almost all of the
money spent on transportation, for example, has
a purely instrumental character. The problem,
then, is that as competition for positional goods
intensiﬁes, households may be forced to make
greater investments in instrumental consump-
tion goods.
As an example, many people move to
the suburbs seeking a positional good — easy
access to both city and countryside. Because of
this, they are forced to make certain invest-
ments in transportation. But suburban devel-
opment is notoriously unstable, since it just
encourages the next generation of suburban
migrants to “leapfrog” existing developments
and build up the nearest countryside. Suppose,
then, that in order to retain access to the posi-
tional good in question, a family is forced to
move to a more outlying district, and thus to
purchase a second car. This consumption has
a purely instrumental, defensive character, and
thus generates no increase in welfare. Yet it
shows up as an increase in their wealth.
When we talk about productivity gains
and economic growth, what we are really
talking about is an expansion of the material
economy. The process of expansion does not
increase the quantity of positional goods
available; it increases their relative prices only.
Thus, as individuals get richer some goods
become easier to acquire while others contin-
ue to recede over the horizon. The material
goods that they can acquire, however, are sub-
ject to diminishing returns in general. Thus
the unsatisﬁed demand for positional goods
acquires greater relative urgency. As a result,
individuals may even neglect outstanding
material needs in order to purchase goods that
are instrumental in achieving positional
goods, only to ﬁnd themselves frustrated as
others make the same investments.
Thus we have a tendency to greatly
overestimate the contribution that further
economic growth will make to our quality of
life, because we fail to “factor out” all of the
positional goods, which economic growth
will not make us any more likely to obtain.
WHY NOT PRODUCTIVITY?
These three strains of critical inquiry
each identify a mechanism through which
consumption can fail to generate satisfaction.
Put very crudely, we can imagine consumers
engaging in three different types of “non-
productive” consumption: compulsive, defen-
sive and instrumental. If all economic growth
is absorbed into one or another form — and
there is no reason why people cannot engage
in all three simultaneously — then a situa-
tion can arise in which no increase in satis-
faction is observed, either in the aggregate or
at the individual level.
However, this does not show that we
should not strive to achieve productivity gains.
Suppose that we have available to us a more
cost-effective industrial process, which allows
us to boost output with no increase in either
capital stock or labour intensity. Even if we
are sceptical about the possibility that an
increase in the supply of goods will generate
any lasting satisfaction, there is still no reason
not to implement the improved process. It is a
pure efficiency gain, and as such would seem
to generate no losers. Similarly, Galbraith’s
diagnosis of the modern economy as a giant
squirrel-wheel does not present a compelling
case against increasing production. All it says
is that as far as overall satisfaction is concerned,
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ward. This may not be such a problem.
Perhaps the voyage is more important than
the destination.
The case becomes more difficult to
make, however, when we talk about dedicat-
ing signiﬁcant resources to the pursuit of
increased productivity. There have been calls,
for instance, for the government of Canada to
make signiﬁcant investments in research and
development in order to further a productiv-
ity agenda. There have also been calls for var-
ious types of tax reductions, with the same
end in view. Of course, if we had nothing else
to do with these resources, there would be
nothing wrong with funnelling them into
such projects. But given that alternative uses
are available, we need to consider the possi-
bility that they could be better employed
elsewhere. In particular, given that econom-
ic growth is not likely to generate much fur-
ther increase in satisfaction, we must consider
the possibility that other forms of investment
will be more effective at enhancing the wel-
fare of Canadians.
When it comes to considering what
these other uses might be, one way of organ-
izing the conceptual space is to think of the
individual as a consumer of a variety of dif-
ferent types of goods. It has become conven-
tional to divide these up into private goods
(bought and sold through the market), pub-
lic goods (provided by the state, paid for
through taxation) and club goods (provided
collectively within an organization) (Cornes
and Sandler 1996).
4 We can then bisect this
categorization with the distinction between
material goods and positional goods (with
“material” as a somewhat crude term for the
set of goods whose supply can be expanded).
Economic growth essentially tracks increas-
es in the output of material private goods,
along with some material club goods.
Now, as Galbraith has pointed out, just
as increased consumption of any single good
will tend to generate less and less of a gain in
satisfaction, the entire set of private material
goods will also be subject to diminishing
returns. People will satisfy their most impor-
tant desires ﬁrst, then move on to less impor-
tant ones. As a result, we get less “bang for the
buck” out of economic growth as the country
becomes wealthier. However, because eco-
nomic growth directly increases only the set
of private material goods available, we can eas-
ily ﬁnd ourselves in a situation in which we
have satisﬁed all of our urgent needs for pri-
vate goods, but in which we still have serious,
unresolved needs for goods that private mar-
kets fail to supply. But because of unresolved
collective-action problems in the non-market
sector, we may continue to consume more pri-
vate goods, even though we would all prefer
to spend our money on goods that markets are
failing to supply.
Reasonable people may disagree as to
whether we currently suffer from an imbalance
in private and public spending. Galbraith
thought that the United States did, hence his
characterization of American society as having
a peculiar combination of “private opulence”
and “public squalor.” Certainly the expressed
preference of many Canadians for increased
spending on health and education suggests
that Canada suffers from such an imbalance.
But regardless of where one stands on this
empirical question, the analytic framework is
important because it shows that in order to
make the case for increased productivity, we
need to show that this point has not been
reached. In other words, the value of a straight-
forward expansion of the private material
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comes to committing public resources to a
“productivity agenda,” it is not clear that the
money would not be better spent on the direct
provision of public goods.
The same analytical framework is quite
helpful when we consider the fact that all pro-
duction and consumption creates externali-
ties, both positive and negative. This is in fact
a monumental consideration when we keep in
mind that all measures of productivity
growth ignore externalities. It is quite possi-
ble for the negative externalities associated
with a particular production process to com-
pletely outweigh the value of the goods pro-
duced. There is good reason, for instance, to
think that the negative externality associated
with the use of leaded fuel represented a
much larger total cost to society than the pos-
itive economic value associated with
improved valve lubrication. Thus to ask
whether productivity growth is, in general, a
good thing is to propose a cost-beneﬁt analy-
sis that takes into account only some of the
costs and beneﬁts. It is of course impossible
to provide an assessment of such a proposal
without ﬁnding out what the missing costs
and beneﬁts are.
The problem, of course, with externali-
ties is that their magnitude is very difficult to
measure. This is in fact why they remain
externalities — if we could quantify them, it
would be much easier to internalize them.
Thus it is not obvious that one can say any-
thing at a general level about the relative size
of these “external” costs and beneﬁts. But in
this context again, Galbraith’s analysis pro-
vides us with some helpful ideas. Analytically,
we can divide the problem into two questions:
How large are the positive and negative exter-
nalities relative to one another?, and How
large is the net value of these externalities rel-
ative to the economic value of the good?
Positive Versus Negative Externalities.
Economists sometimes speak of externalities as
if they were an isolated occurrence. This is deeply
misleading. Externalities are ubiquitous, a nec-
essary consequence of every production and con-
sumption process. If I enjoy watching the patrons
in a café having a drink, then their consumption
generates a positive externality. But if they have
taken up all the seats, so that I am forced to have
my drink standing, then their crowding creates a
negative externality for me. Because of this, the
set of externalities produced by every good is
extremely complex. This would seem to make it
difficult to say anything general about their rel-
ative level. If most goods generated positive
externalities on balance, we would have nothing
to worry about. Unfortunately, we have reason
to believe that such will not be the case. It is a
structural feature of the market that ﬁrms have
an incentive to “externalize” costs whenever pos-
sible, along with an incentive to “internalize”
beneﬁts as much as they can. Thus if a regulato-
ry regime remains unchanged, we can expect the
balance of positive and negative externalities to
shift toward the negative. Firms will ﬁnd ways
to “monetize” portions of the value they create
that has traditionally escaped in the form of pos-
itive externalities, just as they will ﬁnd ways to
shift costs around in such a way as to displace
them onto those who cannot demand ﬁnancial
compensation for the loss.
Value of Externalities Versus Economic
Value. Just as we can expect the relative size
of negative externalities to grow relative to
the positive ones, we can also expect them to
grow relative to the economic value of the
goods produced. This is again due to the
diminished urgency of our need for more pri-
vate material goods. This means that under a
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social cost will eventually come to exceed pri-
vate economic beneﬁt. At this point, the wel-
fare-maximizing course of action is to adopt
a zero-growth policy — even though oppor-
tunities for expansion of the sphere of private
material goods are available. Of course, the
regulatory regime is never static, since gov-
ernment does tend to respond to new prob-
lems as they arise. The point is more a
conceptual one. It is that there is no reason a
priori to prefer increased growth over
increased regulation as a strategy for improv-
ing the welfare of Canadians. The case must
be made on empirical grounds.
Both of these arguments suggest that
focusing on productivity growth may mean
ignoring potential Pareto-improvements —
and thus would be inefficient in the welfare
economist’s sense of the term. Thus the argu-
ment here is not a disagreement over values.
The question is simply whether productivity
growth is able to deliver what its own propo-
nents have promised. The ﬁrst consideration
— that there may be an imbalance in the rel-
ative satisfaction levels of consumers of private
and public goods — suggests that the
resources consumed in expanding the private
material economy may be misallocated, and
hence wasted. The second consideration —
which focuses on externalities — suggests that
such an expansion may mean not only that
certain other opportunities are foregone, but
also that the expansion itself may directly gen-
erate harms that negate any welfare gains asso-
ciated with the goods produced. Furthermore,
there is no reason why these two considera-
tions may not come into play simultaneously.
Thus, the case for increased growth is a lot
harder to make than it may initially have
seemed.
ALTERNATIVE PRIORITIES
You can’t beat something with nothing.
So if not productivity growth, what? What
other broadly “economic” objective might we
establish as a social priority? Here are a few
suggestions, in no particular order. It is worth
noting that none of these proposals is necessar-
ily antagonistic to a policy of increased pro-
ductivity, although in each case one can easily
imagine situations in which the two might
conﬂict. My goal is simply to identify some
other policy agendas that would be, in my
view, as likely to improve social welfare as a
commitment to increased productivity.
Internalize Externalities. We might choose
to pursue the ideal of a society in which all
externalities are fully internalized. Call it the
“pay as you play” society. The goal would sim-
ply be to have each individual pay the full cost
that his or her choices impose upon others. At
the moment, we make only a half-hearted effort
in this direction, and we have not dedicated
nearly enough creative energy to the task of
designing appropriate incentive mechanisms.
There is clearly enormous room for improve-
ment, most obviously when it comes to the
environment. Even if one does not believe that
catastrophic environmental collapse is immi-
nent, the mere risk of inducing such a collapse
is difficult to justify when these risks are being
run in the service of a growth policy whose
welfare gains have become either negligible or
non-existent.
Reduce Crowding. One of the most sig-
niﬁcant structural transformations taking
place in Canadian consumption patterns
involves the erosion of suburban lifestyles.
This is largely caused by intense competition
for positional goods. The result has been a sig-
niﬁcant increase in crowding and congestion,
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ty dilution of the goods sought. It is this phe-
nomenon that, in my opinion, has generated
the widespread feeling of being economically
“squeezed” among the middle classes. Part of
the problem stems from public complacency
on the issue of crowding, simply because
Canada has such a low overall population den-
sity. But these statistics are very misleading.
Canada is currently one of the most highly
urbanized societies in the world. Thus crowd-
ing is likely to become an increasingly impor-
tant quality of life issue for many Canadians.
Designing and implementing systems to man-
age access to positional goods therefore has
enormous potential welfare beneﬁts.
Increase the Supply of Public Goods. Public
opinion surveys of Canadians consistently show
a very low level of concern for increased con-
sumption of private goods, combined with a
strong desire for increased consumption of pub-
lic goods, including health, education, com-
munication and even transportation (Bricker
and Greenspon 2001). This generates a strong
presumption in favour of the hypothesis that
there is currently an imbalance between spend-
ing on private and on public goods. The root
cause of this imbalance is tax resistance —
which is rational at the level of the individual
citizen and consumer, insofar as it reﬂects a free-
rider incentive, but is often irrational at the
level of public policy.
Promote Leisure. Implicit in the discussion
of productivity growth is often the assumption
that increased productivity should be used to
increase economic output. This has certainly
been the trend in the past 25 years. However,
given the increase in complaints about time
pressure and work-family balance, we might
consider taking more assertive measures aimed
at reducing the workweek. Regulatory inter-
vention, along the lines recently undertaken in
France, might be welfare-enhancing.
Increase Security. Studies have shown
that unemployment has a serious negative
impact on subjective well-being (Frey and
Stutzer 2001, 95-102). Furthermore, the
risks that individuals face in the marketplace
generally, and the labour market in particu-
lar, represent a source of disutility that, like
leisure, is largely invisible from the stand-
point of the national accounts. Policies aimed
at reducing labour market volatility could
lead to signiﬁcant welfare gains (even though
they might also produce overemployment,
and hence reduced productivity).
Again, it is worth stating that none of
these objectives is necessarily in tension with
productivity growth. For example, if it is true
that “work expands to ﬁll the time available for
its completion,” then legislatively imposed lim-
itations on the workweek could lead to impor-
tant productivity gains. However, increased
leisure could also be promoted through the
introduction of a more progressive income tax.
It is widely believed that such a tax regime
would dampen productivity growth. The
choice of how to prioritize the various objectives
is therefore political, in the broadest sense of the
term. The claim here is simply that a negative
impact on productivity growth should by no
means be sufficient to take any of the options
off the table.
Finally, it should be noted that each of
these proposals is motivated by a desire to
improve the efficiency of our economic insti-
tutions (understood in terms of welfare, not
wealth).
5 The underlying intuition is that
since economic growth seems to have been
generating no payoff in terms of individual
satisfaction, any one of these policies seems
more likely to improve welfare as a policy of
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to consider some of the other values that we
might like to promote, beyond mere efficien-
cy. It could easily be argued, for instance, that
as a society we have been willing to accept
considerable inequality in the distribution of
wealth in order to promote economic growth,
but now that economic growth has ceased to
provide signiﬁcant social beneﬁts, these out-
standing inequalities have become increasing-
ly unjustiﬁable. Such an argument would be
much more controversial than anything
advanced here, which is why I have chosen to
limit myself to efficiency concerns.
CONCLUSION
Consider the following, surprising fact:
the average speed of traffic in the city of London
is the same now as it was 100 years ago — 11
miles per hour. How can this situation be
improved? In the ﬁrst half of the 20th century,
the solution might have seemed obvious: “faster
cars.” But can anyone still believe this?
Believing that productivity growth is
the key to resolving our problems is essen-
tially the same as believing that faster cars
will speed up the traffic in London. If the
proposed solution hasn’t worked so far, it is
not likely to start working any time soon.
This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t build
faster cars, if we have the means and oppor-
tunity to do so. Similarly, there is nothing
wrong with productivity growth. But we
shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking that
it is going to accomplish very much.
The commitment to productivity growth
becomes somewhat pernicious, however, when
we assign it lexical priority, or when we try to
maximize it. Furthermore, there is no particular
reason to be concerned about our relative pro-
ductivity levels.
6 After all, what do we lose by
falling behind? Unless one misunderstands the
logic of comparative advantage in international
trade, it is difficult to see where the downside
lies. When we talk about the relative “standard
of living” of Canadians, it is important to
remember that this, for the most part, means rel-
ative “consumption of private material goods.”
Since preferences over this bundle of consump-
tion goods may vary, there is no reason why a
decline in relative “standard of living” should
entail a decline in relative “quality of life.” In fact,
if over-investment in the production of private
goods in another country stems from unresolved
collective action problems in its public sector,
there is no reason why our “quality of life” could
not increase relative to theirs, even as our relative
“standard of living” drops.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that
the vast majority of Canadians compete only
with other Canadians for positional and sta-
tus goods. As a result, lower productivity
here is unlikely to affect their relative posi-
tion when it comes to this competition. And
in cases where it does, there are often rela-
tively simple legislative remedies available.
Thus the welfare of the average Canadian is
unlikely to be affected by the superior pur-
chasing power of foreigners. The same can-
not be said for the small “international set”
of privileged Canadians who fancy purchas-
ing real estate in New York or Paris. For
them, slow productivity growth leads to an
erosion of their relative position. But it
should be recognized that their interests are
those of a very small, albeit vocal, minority.
One of the great conceptual revolutions
of the 19th century was the discovery that
the production and consumption of wealth is
not a zero-sum game, and thus that growth
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tion when it comes to improving the welfare
of the lower and working classes. But with
the growth of riches comes a steady erosion
of the positive-sum character of our econo-
my. Increasingly, the difference between
social classes in our society is not that one
class has a lot of stuff and the other does not.
More often, they both simply have different
versions (often, different brands) of the same
stuff. No increase in general prosperity will
ever narrow this gap. As a result, we are now
in danger of overestimating the amount that
can be achieved through growth, and under-
estimating the power of redistribution.
7
NOTES
1 I distinguish a “technical” efficiency concept from a
“welfare” efficiency concept, such as the Pareto
principle.
2 For an overview of developments, see Wong and
Picot (2001).
3 I lump wants and needs together because any
distinction between the two relies upon an extremely
controversial and problematic normative judgement.
4 Note that I am not using the more restrictive
deﬁnition of a public good popular among some
economists — a good that is “non-rival and non-
excludable.” I take a good to be public in cases where
an underlying market failure makes it more efficient
to organize the transactions through taxation. Thus I
treat government health insurance as a public good,
for example, even though it is easy to exclude
individuals from enjoying the beneﬁts.
5 For a more general discussion of this distinction, see
Heath (2001).
6 It is also important to note that concern over relative
productivity, in an international context in which at
least one nation is trying to maximize productivity,
implicitly commits one to a policy of maximization.
7 Here I am rephrasing suggestive remarks by Hirsch
(1976, 67).
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